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Raising the Bar: Maples v. Thomas and the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel
Carol S. Steiker
Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law
M
y course on the American death penalty has more than its share 
of dramatic and powerfully engaging issues and cases. Should the 
death penalty be limited to the crime of murder, as a matter of policy or 
of constitutional law? Is it constitutional to execute juvenile offenders or 
those with mental retardation? What role does race play in the capital jus-
tice system, and what is its constitutional significance? But I have never 
seen my students more avid and appalled than last semester, when they 
encountered the Court’s recent decision, per Justice Ginsburg, in Maples 
v. Thomas, issued in January of last year.
  The case involved a prisoner on Alabama’s death row, Corey Maples, 
whose conviction and death sentence were upheld on direct appeal. In 
state post-conviction proceedings, Maples was represented pro bono by 
two young lawyers from Sullivan & Cromwell in New York—a role that 
many of my students could imagine themselves playing in the not-too-
distant future. These two associates filed Maples’s state habeas petition, 
alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel among other trial infirmities. 
While this petition was pending in the Alabama trial court, the two asso-
ciates left Sullivan & Cromwell for other employment opportunities, but 
failed to move for substitution of counsel or even to inform the Alabama 
court or Maples himself of their departure. When Maples’s state habeas 
petition was denied, notices of the court’s order were sent to the associates 
at Sullivan & Cromwell’s address in New York, where the mail-room clerk 
marked them “return to sender” and sent them back, unopened, to the 
trial court clerk, who attempted no further mailing. After the clock ran 7
out on Maples’s chance to file an appeal from the denial of his state habeas 
petition, the Alabama Attorney General sent a letter directly to Maples 
informing him—for the first time—of the missed deadline and notify-
ing him that he had four weeks in which to file a federal habeas petition. 
Maples called his mother, and his mother called Sullivan & Cromwell. 
The law firm tried to convince the Alabama courts to give them another 
chance to meet the appeals deadline, going all the way to the Alabama 
Supreme Court. But Alabama’s position, upheld by its courts, was that 
the trial court clerk had met the state’s obligations by sending notice of 
the trial court’s order to the New York lawyers’ address of record. The state 
trial court maintained that it was “unwilling to enter into subterfuge in 
order to gloss over mistakes made by counsel for the petitioner.”
  Having procedurally defaulted his state habeas appeal, however, Ma-
ples was then held to be barred from federal habeas corpus review as 
well. Because state prisoners do not have a constitutional right to counsel 
on state habeas review, their state habeas counsel’s mistakes cannot or-
dinarily constitute “cause” to excuse a state procedural default, because 
such counsel is presumed to be acting as the prisoner’s agent, rather than 
as some force “external” to the prisoner. In other words, generally state 
prisoners are stuck with their lawyers’ mistakes on state habeas, where a 
default will then bar all further review on the merits of their claims in 
both state and federal courts. In light of this precedent, the federal habeas 
court denied review of Maples’s claims as procedurally defaulted, and the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
  Justice Ginsburg, writing for a 7- majority of the Court, noted that 
while the general rule of habeas counsel “agency” need not be disturbed, a 
“markedly different situation is presented . . . when an attorney abandons 
his client without notice.” Abandonment is unlike any other form of at-
torney negligence or error, in that the rationale of attorney “agency” fails 
in such circumstances. In Justice Ginsburg’s words, “[A] client cannot be 
charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has abandoned 
him. Nor can a client be faulted for failing to act on his own behalf 
when he lacks reason to believe his attorneys of record, in fact, are not 7
representing him.”4 Finding that the circumstances of Maples’s case did 
indeed establish such abandonment, the Court held that “principles of 
agency law and fundamental fairness point to the same conclusion: There 
was indeed cause to excuse Maples’s procedural default.”5
  This holding is a rather modest and common-sense modification of 
federal habeas corpus law—so modest and common-sensical that it did 
not produce the kind of ideologically split decision that one often sees in 
other habeas or death penalty cases. Not only Justice Kennedy, the usual 
swing vote, joined the Court’s opinion, but Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito did so as well. What makes Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for 
the Court in Maples noteworthy—and what made it controversial among 
the Justices, to the extent that it was—was Justice Ginsburg’s explicit 
connection of the breakdown of representation in Corey Maples’s case to 
Alabama’s system of capital representation for indigent defendants.
  Justice Ginsburg began her analysis—Part I, Section A of her opinion, 
front and center—with a description of the conditions facing trial counsel 
in death penalty cases in Alabama, noting the low eligibility requirements 
in terms of experience and training for capital defense lawyers, the in-
adequate compensation provided to such lawyers, and the fact that Ala-
bama is nearly alone among the states in failing to provide indigent capital 
defendants with court-appointed lawyers on state habeas review. Justice 
Ginsburg went on to describe the particular circumstances surrounding 
Maples’s case: Only one of his two lawyers had ever previously served in a 
capital case, and neither one had ever tried the penalty phase of a capital 
case. Compensation for each lawyer was capped at $,000 for out-of-court 
work preparing Maples’s case, and at $40/hour for in-court services.
  Although Justice Ginsburg simply sketched the basic facts about Ala-
bama’s indigent capital defense system without much editorial comment, 
the implications were obvious: First, Corey Maples’s post-conviction 
challenge to the adequacy of his trial counsel—his main claim advanced, 
and defaulted, on state habeas review—might well have been merito-
rious, given the prevailing conditions. This likelihood heightened the 
“fundamental fairness” concerns at issue in the case, and by broader 74
implication in all of Alabama’s capital cases. Second, Alabama’s failure 
to provide counsel for indigent capital defendants on state habeas review 
was the impetus for the involvement of the Sullivan & Cromwell associ-
ates (and many other pro bono counsel from big law firms) in Alabama’s 
capital defense system. This recognition suggests that Alabama’s choice 
to require capital defendants to rely on the charity of the public interest 
and pro bono bar during the crucial stage of state habeas review implies 
some state responsibility—moral if not legal—for the breakdowns that 
will inevitably occur in such a system.
  These implications were controversial among the Justices. Justice Alito, 
who joined the Court’s opinion, nonetheless concurred separately in order 
to absolve Alabama of responsibility for the breakdown of representation 
in Maples’s case. In Justice Alito’s view, the breakdown was the one-off 
product of “a perfect storm” of “unique circumstances.”6 He failed to see, 
he wrote, “any important connection between what happened in this 
case and Alabama’s system for providing representation for prisoners who 
are sentenced to death.”7 Justice Scalia, who dissented along with Justice 
Thomas, was even more dismissive of the implied connection between 
Alabama’s indigent defense system and Maples’s case, describing the por-
tion of the Court’s opinion detailing Alabama’s indigent defense proce-
dures as “inexplicable.”8
  But the great strength of this opinion—and of Justice Ginsburg’s opin-
ions and votes in other right-to-counsel and death penalty cases—is the 
recognition that the larger problem of which Corey Maples’s case is only 
a part is not one of bad apples or “perfect storms.” Rather, there are 
systemic failures across the country in the provision of defense counsel 
services to the indigent. Justice Ginsburg has been an influential voice on 
the Court to address these problems, both by expanding the situations in 
which the right to counsel obtains and by policing the implementation 
of the right. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinions in Alabama v. 
Shelton,9 which required counsel in cases where the defendant receives 
a suspended sentence of incarceration, and in Halbert v. Michigan,0 
which required counsel for defendants who seek to appeal guilty pleas, 75
the primary engine of disposition in our current criminal justice system. 
In a rare recognition by the Court of the implication of systemic failures, 
Justice Ginsburg wrote a majority opinion in a constitutional speedy trial 
case holding that delay resulting from “systemic breakdown in the pub-
lic defender system” should be charged to the state rather than to the 
defendant. Moreover, she has been a staunch supporter of maintaining 
performance standards for indigent defense counsel, penning a lone con-
currence in Harrington v. Richter, to argue that counsel was deficient for 
failing to consult blood experts in Richter’s noncapital murder trial, and 
joining slim majorities to require adequate investigation of mitigating 
evidence by defense counsel in a series of important capital cases.
  My students are transfixed by Corey Maples’s case—in large part, per-
haps, by the scary schadenfreude of seeing two recent law grads fail so 
egregiously and so publicly. But many of my students are also outraged 
by the window the case opens onto the structure of indigent criminal 
defense in Alabama, especially in capital cases. Justice Ginsburg helps us 
make sense of the view by situating the injustice in Maples’s case in the 
larger capital justice system. By doing so, she urges all of us in the legal 
profession to keep our eyes on these systemic injustices, as she continues 
to do, vigilantly, from the high Court.
m
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